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THE JUDICIAL USE OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
Andrew S Butler * 
Petra Butler ** 
In this essay we briefly examine the judicial use of international human rights law in New 
Zealand.  In particular, we identify the relevant sources of international human rights law for New 
Zealand and the possible methods of application of international human rights law in New Zealand's 
domestic judicial system, we assess the actual significance accorded to international human rights 
law, and attempt to account for the marked increase in use of international human rights law by New 
Zealand judges. 
This  essay concentrates on judicial use of international human rights law.  It should 
however be noted that the use of such law in New Zealand is not confined to the judicial 
arena.  As Paul Hunt and Margaret Bedggood have illustrated, 1 there has been substantial use 
of international human rights law in other fora such as parliamentary select committees, and 
in Human Rights Commission reports.  In addition, all proposals to Cabinet for new 
legislation must certify compliance with relevant international obligations (including human 
rights norms) or else contain an explanation as to why the legislation should proceed 
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1 P Hunt & M Bedggood, "The International Law Dimension of Human Rights in New Zealand" in G 
Huscroft & P Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) ch 2 at 58­62.
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notwithstanding inconsistency with those obligations. 2 Moreover, international complaint 
mechanisms have been used by New Zealanders who claim an interference with rights 
guaranteed by certain international human rights treaties. 3 
I RELEVANT SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
The generally accepted sources of international law are 
• custom 
• general principles 
• treaties 
Of these sources of law, the most relevant for international human rights purposes is 
treaty law.  Customary international law has yet to develop an extensive settled jurisprudence 
of human rights obligations ­ the universalisation of international human rights standards 
through the adherence of many states to the various human rights treaties does however open 
up possibilities in this area and there has been much debate 4 as to whether the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights represents customary international law in the human rights 
field.  Nor has the concept of "general principles of international law" made great strides in 
expanding the reach of international human rights law absent a treaty.  However, once a state 
is subject to a treaty­based human rights obligation, international treaty monitoring bodies 
have been quite creative in the evolution and application of "general principles of 
international law" specially tailored to human rights norms. 5 
2 See Cabinet Office, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabinet Office Manual (1996) paras 
5.26 and App 6 at 122 and 124. 
3 See the discussion of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions complaint to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) alleging violations of Conventions 87 and 98 in Hunt & Bedggood above n 1 at 61. 
As at the date of writing some 8 communications have been made to the Human Rights Committee 
under the (first) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
4 See eg I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) 570. 
5 See generally J G Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, 1988).
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Relevant human rights treaties for New Zealand include: 6 
• the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the ICCPR") (1966) 7 
• the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") 
(1966) 8 
• the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination ("Race Convention") (1965) 9 
• the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women ("Women's Convention") (1979) 10 
• the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("Child Convention") 
(1989) 11 
• various International Labour Organisation ("ILO") Conventions. 12 
At the same time there are in the international human rights arena other statements, 
declarations, opinions of experts, etc, which carry great weight and which are often looked to 
6 A broader view of what is embraced by the notion of human rights treaties is evident in K Keith, "The 
Application of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand" (1997) 32 Texas ILJ 401, 403­404.  Sir 
Kenneth would include conventions in relation to kidnapping, genocide, slavery, hostages, obscene 
publications and so on as human rights instruments.  Without disagreeing with that view, but in light 
of space contraints, we propose to focus on a more limited range of international treaties. 
7 R v Goodwin (No 2) [1990­92] 3 NZBORR 314, 321 (CA) (art 9(1)); Simpson v Attorney­General [Baigent's 
case] (1994) 1 HRNZ 42 (CA) (art 2(3)); and Tavita v Minister of Immigration (1993) 1 HRNZ 30, 35­6 (CA) 
(arts 23(1), 24(1) and 24(3)). 
8 Lawson v Housing New Zealand (1996) 3 HRNZ 285, passim (HC) and Auckland Provincial District Local 
Authorities' Officers IOUW below n 12 (art 10(2)). 
9 Re "Exposing the AIDS Scandal" (1993) 1 HRNZ 170, 179 (IPT) (art 4) and Wheen v Real Estate Agents 
Licensing Board (1997) 4 HRNZ 15, 28 (HC). 
10 NRHA v Human Rights Commission (1997) 4 HRNZ 37 (HC) and Auckland Provincial District Local 
Authorities' Officers IOUW below n 12 (art 11(2(b)). 
11 Tavita above n 7 (CA) (arts 9(1) and 9(4)) and Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority (1996) 2 HRNZ 510, 
516­517 (CA) (arts 3(1), 8, 9 and 16). 
12 Tranz Rail Ltd (t/a Interisland Line) v New Zealand Seafarers' Union [1996] 1 ERNZ 216 (EC) (Convention 
68) and Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities' Officers IOUW v Onehunga Borough Council (1989) 2 
NZELC 96, 956 (LC) (Conventions 3, 103 and 156).
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in determining the appropriate international human rights standard in a given situation.  In 
particular, the following documents, though not treaties, have been referred to by New 
Zealand courts: 
• the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") (1948) 13 
• the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1984) 14 
• the United Nations Declaration against Religious Intolerance (1981) 15 
• the Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967). 16 
Finally, frequent reference has been made to provisions of, and jurisprudence under, 
regional human rights treaties to which New Zealand is not and will not be a party.  In 
particular, the courts have made extensive use of European Convention jurisprudence. 17 This 
jurisprudence has been used both to explore the meaning of similarly worded or closely 
related articles of the ICCPR, 18 and, in a more general way, to establish relevant international 
standards by reference to which the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights 
Act 1993, the Immigration Act 1987, and so on should be interpreted. 19 
II HOW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAY BE USED IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
There are a number of ways in which international human rights law may be employed 
before New Zealand courts. 
13 Van Gorkom v Attorney­General [1977] 1 NZLR 535, 542 (SC); Baigent's case above n 7 at 82 (art 8); Lawson 
above n 8 passim (art 25(1)); Quilter v Attorney­General (1996) 3 HRNZ 1, 22 (HC) ("Quilter (HC)"); 
NRHA v Human Rights Commission above n 10; and R v Gardiner (1997) 4 HRNZ 7, 10 (CA) (art 12). 
14 Quilter v Attorney­General (1997) 4 HRNZ 170, 192 (CA, per Thomas J dissenting in part) ("Quilter (CA)"). 
15 Re J [an infant]; DGSW v B (1995) 2 HRNZ 99 (HC). 
16 Van Gorkom above n 13 at 542 (art 10(1)). 
17 References have also been made to Inter­American Convention decisions.  See eg Baigent's case above n 
7 at 83 (per Hardie Boys J) where the Velásquez Rodríguez case is referred to. 
18 Tavita above n 7 at 36­39; R v L (1993) 1 HRNZ 310, 320­321 (CA). 
19 R v B (1994) 1 HRNZ 1, 11­13 (HC); Police v Kohler (1993) 1 HRNZ 303 (CA); Tavita above n 7 at 40; R v 
Coghill (1995) 2 HRNZ 125, 139­140 (CA).
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The fundamental proposition of which sight must not be lost is that as a matter of New 
Zealand law, Parliament may exercise its sovereignty in a manner inimical to New Zealand's 
international obligations (including human rights obligations) by enacting legislation which is 
inconsistent with those obligations.  Should Parliament choose to do so, it is the duty of the 
courts to give effect to that decision. 20 
For many years it was thought that international law in general had little impact on 
domestic law unless it had been incorporated into New Zealand law by statute. 21 To hold 
otherwise, it was believed, would permit the executive to make law without reference to 
Parliament by the expedient of entering into international treaties (treaty­making being an 
exclusive function of the Crown).  That said, the courts were prepared to accommodate 
international law within the domestic sphere in some situations.  Thus, customary 
international law had domestic effect as part of the common law without the need for 
legislative action. 22 (This of course only to the extent that the rule of customary international 
law was not inconsistent with a statute.)  Furthermore, on occasion, the courts would attempt 
to construe a statute in a manner consistent with international obligations, though there was 
no obligation to do so. 23 
20 See eg Richardson J in Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222, 229 (CA): "if the terms of 
domestic legislation are clear and unambiguous they must be given effect in our Courts whether or not 
they carry out New Zealand's international obligations."  See also Re Bennett (1993) 2 HRNZ 358, 361 
(HC); Bailey v Whangarei District Court (1995) 2 HRNZ 275, 287 (HC); and Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v 
Attorney­General [1994] 2 NZLR 451, 457­458 (HC) (though note comment below).  A rider should be 
added that on a number of occasions Lord Cooke of Thorndon stated that some rights were so 
fundamental that not even Parliament could deprive persons of those rights.  These comments have yet 
to be given effect to, and many commentators doubt whether the judges could lawfully act upon these 
sentiments.  See also Mangawaro Enterprises at 458 where Gallen J suggested in obiter that in an extreme 
case international instruments might be used by the courts to impugn domestic law. 
21 In Ashby above n 20 at 224 Cooke J said: "It is elementary that international treaty obligations are not 
binding in domestic law until they have become incorporated [by an Act of Parliament]." 
22 See eg Marine Steel Ltd v Government of the Marshall Islands [1981] 2 NZLR 1 (HC) and Governor of Pitcairn 
v Sutton [1995] 1 NZLR 426 (CA). 
23 See eg Van Gorkom above n 13, where Cooke J referred to international human rights documents in the 
course of determining that certain regulations had been made ultra vires.
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However, the notion that international law requires specific parliamentary activity to have 
domestic effect no longer holds sway, particularly in the field of human rights. 24 Thus, the 
courts have accepted that it is appropriate to use international treaty law, and jurisprudence 
thereunder, to interpret domestic law in a number of ways. 
First, the Court of Appeal has accepted the general proposition that, "the Court should 
strive to interpret legislation consistently with the treaty obligations of New Zealand." 25 This 
should occur, "whether or not the legislation was enacted with the purpose of implementing 
the relevant text." 26 The result is that interpretation by reference to treaty law is no longer 
optional, but required, unless the domestic statute is unambiguously incompatible with the 
treaty obligation. 
Second, international human rights provisions and jurisprudence are used to interpret 
specific provisions of New Zealand human rights statutes.  This flows naturally from the 
general proposition stated above.  But it is particularly apposite in the human rights field 
because many New Zealand human rights statutes make explicit reference to the international 
antecedents which have prompted their enactment and which inspired their wording. 27 
These references have been taken by the courts to represent implicit permission, and in some 
24 For a useful article on the extent to which parliamentary activity ought to be required before 
international obligations can have domestic effect, see J B Elkind & A Shaw, "The Municipal 
Enforcement of the Prohibition against Racial Discrimination: A Case Study on New Zealand and the 
1981 Springbok Tour" (1988) 55 BYIL 189. 
25 Puli'uvea above n 11 at 516­517. 
26 New Zealand Airline Pilots Association Inc v Attorney­General [1997] 3 NZLR 269, 289 (CA).  With respect 
to the Employment Contracts Act 1991, see eg New Zealand Seafarers' Union above n 12 (reference to ILO 
Convention 68 as regards provision of food and water at no charge to employees); the Maternity Leave 
and Employment Protection Act 1980, see eg Auckland Provincial District Local Authorities' Officers IOUW 
above n 12 (concepts of "key position" and "reasonably practicable" in MELP Act determined with 
extensive reference to relevant ILO conventions, and recommendations, ICESCR and the Women's 
Convention); the Guardianship Act 1968, see B v M [1997] 3 NZLR 202 (HC) (meaning of s 17 "affected" 
determined by reference to art 23 of the ICCPR). 
27 In addition to Recital (b) of the Bill of Rights discussed below, see also the Long Titles to the Race 
Relations Act 1971, the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, the Human Rights Act 1993 (which 
replaces the 1971 and 1977 Acts), and the Privacy Act 1993.  See also s 4(1) of the Human Rights Act 
which lists as one of the functions of the Human Rights Commission the ability to report to the Prime 
Minister on action needed to ensure "better compliance with standards laid down in international 
instruments on human rights" and on the "desirability of New Zealand becoming bound by any 
[international] instrument."
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cases implicit command, to consider relevant international treaties and jurisprudence in 
interpreting domestic law.  Indeed, while many provisions of domestic human rights statutes 
differ in their wording from their international antecedents, specific references to those 
antecedents has been regarded as legitimating judicial reliance on international jurisprudence. 
A good example is Recital (b) of the Long Title to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
("the Bill of Rights") which records that the 1990 statute is designed, "To affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights".  As 
Cartwright J observed in Bailey v Whangarei District Court, 28 the effect of this recital is that, 
"The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act transparently acknowledges its genesis in the ICCPR and 
sets out to encapsulate the principles contained in the Covenant."  Recital (b) and its statement 
of purpose have been frequently referred to in order to justify interpretations of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act which are consistent with the ICCPR and with the jurisprudence of 
the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and other relevant international 
jurisprudence.  For example, in NRHA v Human Rights Commission, Cartwright J referred to 
Recital (b) as "acknowledg[ing] the international framework from which its [ie the Bill of 
Rights'] principles derive" and then referred to international jurisprudence to assist her in 
determining the meaning of "discrimination" in section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights. 29 
There are limits to the use of international materials in interpreting domestic human rights 
statutes.  In particular, if Parliament has deliberately chosen to under­incorporate an 
international obligation, it will be difficult to convince the courts to remedy the deficiency. 
Thus, in R v Barlow, 30 Richardson J noted that while the ICCPR contains a general affirmation 
of the right to liberty and security of the person (article 9(1)) the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act does not.  His honour regarded this departure from the wording of the ICCPR as "a 
deliberate decision on the part of the Legislature."  Hence it was not possible to introduce the 
wider ICCPR guarantee as an aspect of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights. 31 Similarly, 
in BHP NZ Steel Ltd v O'Dea, 32 the High Court was invited to hold that opinions expressed by 
a trade unionist in relation to employment matters were covered by the notion of "political 
28 Bailey above n 20 at 287 (HC). 
29 Above n 10 at 55. 
30 (1995) 2 HRNZ 635 (CA).  See also Quilter (CA) above n 14 at 217 (per Keith J). 
31 Ibid at 655. 
32 (1997) 4 HRNZ 456 (HC).
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opinion" in section 21 of the Human Rights Act 1993.  Reliance was placed on the ICCPR 
which protects persons from discrimination based on, inter alia, "political or other opinion". 
The High Court declined to extend the political opinion discrimination ground to trade union 
activities.  Having referred to the parliamentary history of the provision and its predecessors, 
the court stated: 33 
In our view the Court cannot ignore the fact that the New Zealand parliament in the Human Rights 
Act has chosen to incorporate into domestic law only some of the rights recognised in various 
international covenants and conventions.  In those circumstances the Court cannot use the 
generality of provisions in the international instruments to increase the scope of what our sovereign 
Parliament has decided should apply domestically.  Further, although in a sensitive and important 
area such as this words should not be read down, where Parliament has deliberately provided 
protection for some rights which enjoy international recognition, but not others, it would be wrong 
for a Court to stretch or manipulate the clear words of a statute so as to provide protection in a 
greater or different area than Parliament has determined should apply. 
That said, where ICCPR provisions have not been incorporated into New Zealand's 
human rights legislation, a legislative prohibition against reliance upon the ICCPR provisions 
will not necessarily be implied.  Thus, in B v M, 34 the High Court used article 23 of the ICCPR 
which concerns family rights to assist in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights and hence give 
a particular interpretation to the word "affected" found in section 17 of the Guardianship Act 
1968.  This, even though there is no provision in the Bill of Rights which directly corresponds 
to article 23.  Similarly, in Baigent's case 35 —discussed in more detail below—the Court of 
Appeal by a majority rejected the Crown's submission that it was inappropriate to award 
monetary compensation for breach of the Bill of Rights in the absence of a remedies provision 
in the Bill of Rights.  In so doing, the majority judges placed particular reliance on the 
existence of a remedies clause in the ICCPR. 
As even this brief examination of the case law indicates few criteria have emerged on the 
issue of under­incorporation.  Ultimately much discretion is left in the hands of individual 
judges to determine the significance to be attached to differences in language between the 
33 Ibid at 470­471. 
34 Above n 26. 
35 Above n 7.
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international instruments and domestic law.  From a practitioner's point of view this is 
unsatisfactory. 
Third, international human rights norms may well be considered by the courts as a 
mandatory relevant consideration to which administrators and Ministers must have regard 
when exercising statutory (and other) discretions.  This use of international human rights law 
has proven to be controversial. 
In the 1981 decision of Ashby v Minister of Immigration, it had been held by the Court of 
Appeal that it was only when a statute, "expressly or by implication identifies a consideration 
as one to which regard must be had that the Courts can interfere for failure to take it into 
account." 36 Coupled with the traditional "elementary" proposition that "international treaty 
obligations are not binding in domestic law until they have become incorporated" in a statute, 
it was clear that judicial review of administrative decisions made without reference to 
international obligations would be difficult to successfully pursue.  Some members of the 
Ashby court did leave open the possibility that certain international obligations "might be of 
such overwhelming or manifest importance that the Courts might hold that Parliament could 
not possibly have meant to allow [them] to be ignored." 37 But clearly, the manner of 
expression indicated a high threshold to be met. 
However, in Tavita v Minister of Immigration, 38 the Court of Appeal signalled a bolder 
approach.  In the course of argument in that case, counsel for the Crown had submitted that 
in determining whether to remove Mr Tavita from New Zealand the Minister of Immigration 
was "entitled to ignore the [relevant] international instruments".  While not having to make a 
final determination on this submission, the Court labelled it "an unattractive argument". 39 
Moreover, the Court observed that: 40 
Legitimate criticism could extend to the New Zealand Courts if they were to accept the argument 
that, because a domestic statute giving discretionary powers in general terms does not mention 
international human rights, norms, or obligations, the Executive is necessarily free to ignore them. 
36 Above n 20 at 225 (emphasis in original). 
37 Ibid at 226 (per Cooke J).  See also Somers J at 233­234 (assuming but not deciding). 
38 Above n 7. 
39 Ibid at 40. 
40 Ibid at 41.
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Interestingly, Tavita prompted an overhaul of the Immigration Service's guidelines. 41 
These now contain an explicit acknowledgement of New Zealand's international obligations 
under the ICCPR and the Child Convention and require officials to take into account and give 
substantial weight to particularised considerations which flow from these obligations in 
determining whether to seek removal of overstaying family members from New Zealand. 42 
Accepting that relevant international human rights obligations are matters to which 
regard must be had in the exercise of statutory (or other) discretions, the much harder issue is 
the weight which such obligations ought to be accorded in assessing the impugned decision. 
This issue has yet to receive full attention in New Zealand. 43 Most probably the proper 
weight to be given international obligations will depend on a number of factors such as (a) 
the nature of the obligation; (b) how directly relevant or on point the international provision 
is; (c) the type of discretion involved; (d) the subject­matter of the legislation; and so on.  At 
the same time, however, it must be recalled that generally speaking New Zealand courts are 
reticent to overturn an administrative decision on the ground that insufficient weight was 
attached to a relevant consideration.  Such an exercise could be seen as entering into the 
41 See the useful discussion in M Poole, "The Use and Abuse of International Instruments" in New Zealand 
Law Society Public Law Intensive (Wellington: New Zealand Law Society, 1998) 13 at 19­20.  See also Elika 
v Minister of Immigration [1996] 1 NZLR 741 (HC). 
42 In later cases, the Court of Appeal has emphasised that Tavita requires consideration of international 
human rights obligations in substance rather than in form.  Thus, where immigration officials had 
actually had regard to the sorts of considerations which the ICCPR and the Child Convention required, 
the Court of Appeal held that a decision to make a removal order was validly made, notwithstanding 
that the actual texts of the international instruments had not been specifically referred to.  See eg 
Puli'uvea above n 11 at 514.  See in a different context Lawson above n 8 at 335. 
43 In Ashby, the question was whether the Minister of Immigration had unlawfully exercised his discretion 
to grant visas to the visiting South African international rugby team.  It had been argued for the 
applicants that (a) New Zealand's international human rights obligations were a relevant consideration 
to which the Minister was bound to have regard, and (b) further that those obligations so clearly 
opposed apartheid South Africa and were of "such dominating importance" as to "require the Minister 
to refuse visas."  The court refused to accept this argument, Cooke J emphasising the sensitive nature of 
immigration law and the general latitude given by the statute, Richardson J regarding the issue as non­ 
justiciable and Somers J believing that whatever was required to be considered by the Minister had in 
fact been considered.
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merits of the decision actually made, something which the judges are generally reluctant to 
do. 44 
Lawson v Housing New Zealand indicates that consideration of international obligations 
along with an attempt to weigh them in a balancing exercise may well suffice to discharge the 
Tavita requirements.  In Lawson, a challenge was made to Housing New Zealand's move to 
market rentals for state housing tenants.  It was submitted, inter alia, that such a move was 
inconsistent with rights declared in the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the UDHR.  In rejecting this 
submission, Williams J referred to relevant New Zealand case law and observed that, "the 
authorities demonstrate it is not for this Court to judge whether the Government of New 
Zealand has fully complied with those obligations.  It is sufficient for this Court to reach the 
view that the Government has plainly made efforts to balance the competing factors." 45 The 
evidence established to His Honour's satisfaction that this balancing exercise had been 
undertaken.  He concluded that, "Whether New Zealand has fulfilled its international 
obligations is a matter on which it may be judged in international forums but not in this 
Court." 46 
On this approach predominant weight need not be assigned to international human rights 
norms. 47 This would be in line with English authority.  In R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p Brind, 48 the House of Lords held that an open­ended ministerial discretion 
could not be read down by reference to standards set out in the unincorporated European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Said Lord Bridge of Harwich: 49 
44 See eg R v Home Secretary, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, 762­763 (HL, per Lord Ackner).  See also Lord 
Roskill at 750 and Lord Lowry at 766­767. 
45 Above n 8 at 334. 
46 Ibid. 
47 However, weight must be given to them.  Thus, in Mohamed v Minister of Immigration, HC Wellington 11 
November 1996 AP 262/95, Chisholm J held that the Deportation Review Tribunal's decision not to 
overturn the deportation of the Mohameds was flawed because no meaningful consideration had been 
given to the situation of the Mohameds' children if deportation were to proceed, with far too much 
attention being paid to the deceptive way in which the Mohameds had applied for refugee status in 
New Zealand. 
48 Above n 44. 
49 Ibid at 748 (Lord Roskill concurring).  See also Lord Ackner at 761­762.
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[W]here Parliament has conferred on the executive an administrative discretion without indicating 
the precise limits within which it must be exercised, to presume that it must be exercised within 
Convention limits would be to go far beyond the resolution of an ambiguity. 
That said, the status of Brind in New Zealand is uncertain.  In Tavita, the Court of Appeal 
did not consider it relevant to the issues before it but nonetheless referred to it as "in some 
respects a controversial decision". 50 
Again it will be seen that the application of international human rights norms to 
administrative discretions is itself a highly discretionary exercise.  No criteria have emerged 
to assist practitioners or judges in determining the extent to which the international 
dimension is to be regarded as a mandatory relevant consideration. 
III THE SIGNIFICANCE ACCORDED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
In light of the possible applications of international human rights norms in New Zealand 
outlined above, what actual significance has been accorded to them in the case law?  This 
question can be answered by reference both to frequency of reference and to meaningfulness 
of consideration and prominence of the international human rights dimension in reaching a 
decision.  What follows is not a scientific evaluation but rather one which reflects our 
impression of a substantial increase in the awareness of, and willingness to apply, 
international human rights standards. 
A Frequency of reference 
A check of the index to the specialist law report series, The Human Rights Reports of New 
Zealand (HRNZ) (and its predecessor The New Zealand Bill of Rights Reports (NZBORR)), 
indicates reasonably frequent reference to international human rights provisions and 
jurisprudence.  Of the more than 200 cases reported, some 35 contain references to the ICCPR, 
21 to the European Convention, 7 to the UDHR, 4 to the ICESCR, 4 to the Race Convention 
and 1 to the Women's Convention. As regards international jurisprudence, it would have to 
be admitted that reference to Human Rights Committee jurisprudence and its General 
Comments has been low.  References to Committee views have occurred on at least 5 
occasions, 51 while General Comments have been referred to in perhaps 2 cases. 52 This 
50 Above n 7 at 40. 
51 Goodwin (No 2) above n 7 at 321; Baigent's case above n 7 passim; Martin v District Court at Tauranga 
(1994) 1 HRNZ 186, 199 (HC); R v B above n 19 at 12 (HC); Quilter (CA) above n 14 passim.
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doubtless reflects problems of access to, and unfamiliarity with, the Committee's 
documentation and work.  Frequency of reference to European Convention jurisprudence is 
significantly higher with some 20 references.  This is perhaps not surprising in light of easier 
access 53 to the European Human Rights Reports which are held at many law libraries in New 
Zealand. 
B Meaningfulness of Discussion and Prominence of International Human Rights Law 
In a number of cases, international human rights law receives passing attention: 
discussion of international human rights is confined to acknowledgement or reproduction of 
relevant provisions and little else.  However, in many others there is a substantial amount of 
space devoted to consideration of international human rights law. 
In Tavita, some 4 pages of the report are devoted to citation from, and a discussion of, two 
"distinctly relevant" 54 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as well as relevant 
provisions of the ICCPR and the Child Convention in determining whether the Minister of 
Immigration's decision to decline an appeal against Mr Tavita's removal from New Zealand 
was lawful.  Ultimately, the court adjourned the proceedings so that the Minister could 
reconsider his decision in light of the relevant international human rights norms.  Indeed, as 
noted earlier the effect of Tavita was a redrafting of the Guidelines for officials with an 
explicit direction to consider international human rights obligations in immigration decision­ 
making. 55 
International human rights norms featured prominently in Quilter v Attorney­General, 56 
though the exact scope of these norms was sharply contested.  That case considered two 
issues: (a) was it discriminatory on grounds of sex or sexual orientation to exclude same sex 
couples from marriage contrary to section 19 of the Bill of Rights; (b) if yes, could the 
Marriage Act 1955 be read in a manner consistent with the right to be free from 
52 Martin (HC) above n 51 and Quilter (CA) above n 14. 
53 Problems of access to international human rights jurisprudence has been judicially noted.  In Tavita 
above n 7 at 36 Cooke P discussed two "distinctly relevant" European Court of Human Rights 
judgments which had not been cited in argument, emphasising that there was "no criticism" of counsel 
who had little time to prepare and "such decisions are not always easy to locate." 
54 Above n 7 at 36. 
55 See above text at n 41. 
56 Quilter (CA) above n 14.
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discrimination on those grounds.  For the plaintiffs it was submitted that article 26 of the 
ICCPR was relevant to the issue, especially since the Human Rights Committee had indicated 
in its views in Toonen v Australia that sexual orientation was a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under that provision. 57 
In holding that there was no discrimination within the meaning of section 19, Keith J 
devoted some two­and­a­half pages of the report to a discussion of article 26 and General 
Comment 18 on non­discrimination, as well as to article 23 of the ICCPR on family life. 
Similarly, in reaching the opposite conclusion, Thomas J devoted almost 4 pages to a 
discussion of articles 26 and 23, with extended references to Human Rights Committee 
jurisprudence, to the Committee's General Comment and to the Women's Convention. 
But undoubtedly Baigent's case represents the most significant use of international human 
rights norms to date by a New Zealand court.  In that case, the plaintiffs had allegedly been 
subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure by the police contrary to section 21 of the Bill 
of Rights.  They sought monetary compensation for breach of that right.  For the Crown it 
was submitted that since the Bill of Rights contains no clause explicitly permitting the courts 
to grant remedies in the case of violation, it was not possible to award monetary 
compensation for breach of section 21.  On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiffs 
submitted that, notwithstanding the absence of a remedies provision, regard had to be had to 
article 2(3) of the ICCPR.  That provision reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of 
judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
In light of this provision, it was argued, New Zealand courts were obliged to develop 
remedies appropriate to vindicate the plaintiffs' rights including monetary compensation. 
57 (1995) 69 ALJ 602 (HRC).
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The Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs' submission.  On this basis, and with reference 
to other reasons, the court declared that monetary compensation was a remedy available 
under the Bill of Rights. 
Greatest weight was attached to the ICCPR in the judgment of Casey J.  In contrast to the 
other judgments, the ICCPR was the principal plank of his Honour's analysis.  Recalling 
interpretative principles relevant to the Bill of Rights which had been established in earlier 
cases, Casey J stated that article 2(3) of the ICCPR was "[o]f particular relevance" in the instant 
case. 58 He quoted article 2(3) in full, noted the purpose expressed in Recital (b) of the Bill of 
Rights, and continued: 59 
I do not regard the absence of a remedies provision in the Act as an impediment to the Court's 
ability to "develop the possibilities of judicial remedy" as envisaged by art 2(3)(b).  The rights and 
freedoms affirmed are fundamental in a civilised society and justify a liberal purposive 
interpretation of the Act ... .  Its purpose being the affirmation of New Zealand's commitment to the 
Covenant (including art 2(3)(b)), it would be wrong to conclude that Parliament did not intend there 
to be any remedy for those whose rights have been infringed. ... 
By its accession to the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant on 26 August 1989, New Zealand 
accepted individual access by its citizens to the United Nations Human Rights Committee for 
violations of rights under the Covenant, where they have been unable to obtain a domestic remedy. 
The Act reflects Covenant rights, and it would be a strange thing if Parliament, which passed it one 
year later, must be taken as contemplating that New Zealand citizens could go to the United 
Nations Committee in New York for appropriate redress, but could not obtain it from our own 
Courts. 
It will be seen that these passages from Casey J's judgment proceed on a number of 
interrelated points of great significance to our discussion. 
First, there is his Honour's determination to make New Zealand law accord with a 
relevant ICCPR provision.  Second, there is invocation of the Long Title to legitimate 
reference to and reliance upon relevant ICCPR provisions in order to introduce a remedial 
jurisdiction which is not explicitly bestowed upon the courts by the Bill of Rights.  Third, 
there is an acceptance of the futility of resistance to the application of the ICCPR in New 
58 Above n 7 at 73. 
59 Ibid at 73­74.
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Zealand, in light of the availability of international complaint mechanisms.  Indeed, Cooke P 
for the Court of Appeal a few months earlier in Tavita had stated that in determining the 
impact which ICCPR obligations were to have on statutory discretions in future cases, 60 
an aspect to be borne in mind may be one urged by counsel for the appellant: that since New 
Zealand's accession to the Optional Protocol the United Nations Human Rights Committee is in a 
sense part of this country's judicial structure, in that individuals subject to New Zealand jurisdiction 
have direct rights of recourse to it. 
All of these points demonstrate that international human rights obligations have moved 
centre­stage and that they are to be taken seriously. 
In his judgment, Hardie Boys J also placed great emphasis on the international law 
dimension.  His Honour referred to article 2(3) of the Covenant and to article 8 of the UDHR. 
The latter declares: 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national authorities for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
He too referred to the Long Title of the Bill of Rights and stated 61 
I would be most reluctant to conclude that the Act, which purports to affirm this commitment, 
should be construed other than in a manner that gives effect to it. 
His honour continued by making reference to a number of decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee on effective remedies, as well as to similar decisions under the European 
Convention and the Inter­American Convention.  And in a passage similar to one found in 
Casey J's judgment, Hardie Boys J stated: 62 
Citizens of New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international tribunals to obtain adequate 
remedy for infringement of Covenant rights this country has affirmed by statute.  I consider that the 
Courts are obligated to provide those remedies by domestic law. 
In his judgment, McKay J also relied on the ICCPR.  He said: 63 
60 Above n 7 at 40­41. 
61 Above n 7 at 83. 
62 Ibid at 83. 
63 Ibid at 103­104.
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The second part of the Long Title states the further purpose of the Act to affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.  One of the 
obligations which the International Covenant places on the States Parties is to ensure that an 
effective remedy is given to persons whose rights are violated: art 2(3).  The declared purpose of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act must be considered in interpreting the Act ... . 
In his judgment, Cooke P observed: 64 
The New Zealand Act [ie the Bill of Rights Act] is "(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."  By art 2(3) of the Covenant each State Party 
has undertaken, inter alia, to ensure an effective remedy for violation ... and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy. 
In light of this and other factors, Cooke P also held that a monetary compensation 
jurisdiction existed for breach of the Bill of Rights. 
This extended reference to Baigent's case is intended to highlight (a) the direct relevance of 
international human rights law to legal practice in New Zealand; (b) the importance attached 
by New Zealand judges to compliance with international human rights obligations where 
possible; (c) the fact that international human rights law can have an impact even in the 
absence of a specific corresponding domestic provision; (d) the compliance effect which the 
existence of international complaint mechanisms can have domestically. 
Before concluding this section, a particularly interesting development worthy of note is 
the weight given to the views adopted by the Human Rights Committee.  In R v Goodwin (No 
2), the Court of Appeal had to consider the interpretation of section 22 of the Bill of Rights 
which guarantees "the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained".  In determining the 
meaning of "arbitrary" for the purposes of section 22, the Court referred to the jurisprudence 
of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR equivalent provision, article 9(1).  Having 
noted Recital (b) of the Bill of Rights, and without making a final determination, the Court 
indicated its preference for an interpretation of section 22 which was consistent with the 
Human Rights Committee's jurisprudence.  Significantly, the court observed: 65 
64 Ibid at 57. 
65 Goodwin (No 2) above n 7 at 321.
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Whether a decision of the Human Rights Committee is absolutely binding in interpreting the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act may be debatable, but at least it must be of considerable persuasive 
authority. 
IV WHY HAS THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
IN NEW ZEALAND JUDICIAL DECISIONS INCREASED? 
The answer to this question is somewhat speculative, but there appear to be a number of 
reasons explaining the increased prominence of international human rights norms in New 
Zealand judicial decisions. 
First, as noted earlier, the Long Titles of many human rights statutes explicitly 
acknowledge their international antecedents and many have been passed to enable New 
Zealand to ratify the relevant treaty.  These references have been legitimately regarded by the 
courts as parliamentary encouragement to have regard to relevant international norms in 
interpreting and applying domestic human rights statutes.  Indeed, statutory references to the 
international treaties allow the courts to justify use of international norms and jurisprudence 
on the basis that it gives better effect to Parliament's intention in enacting the domestic 
statute. 
Second, the universalisation of human rights norms makes it easier for domestic courts to 
accept that international human rights treaty norms represent civilised values of right 
conduct which have an inherent merit regardless of their location in an unincorporated treaty. 
Third, the courts have become more prepared to assume that international obligations are 
intended to be taken seriously by New Zealand, and that they have a part to play in actuating 
them.  Thus, rather than fearing that giving effect to international human rights norms would 
be seen to permit the executive to make law without parliamentary involvement, nowadays 
the courts are more concerned to ensure that international human rights commitments do not 
smack of "window­dressing". 66 The courts have realised that unless they utilise international 
human rights law in their decisions "window­dressing" will be the inevitable result. 
Fourth, the availability of international complaint mechanisms has had an impact.  The 
courts have recognised that (unless domestic law explicitly enacts contrary to international 
law) there is little point in making decisions contrary to international human rights norms 
66 The phrase "window­dressing" is used in Tavita above n 7 at 40 and Baigent's case above n 7 at 74 (per 
Casey J) in connection with Child Convention and ICCPR protections.
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when these are susceptible to challenge on the international plane.  Inevitably, this has 
encouraged counsel to cite, and judges to give effect to, international human rights provisions 
and jurisprudence. 67 
Fifth, there are more international human rights instruments in existence today which are 
of relevance to New Zealand than there were a number of years ago.  Indeed, it must be 
recalled that apart from the work of the ILO not much international human rights law existed 
until after the Second World War.  It should not be surprising that it would take time for 
international developments to make an impact domestically when so many legal practitioners 
had been trained in ignorance of them.  Allied to this point, is the fact that international law 
though still not compulsory at New Zealand law schools continues to strengthen in terms of 
its presence on law school curricula. 
Sixth, there has been a growth in New Zealand of "rights consciousness".  One of the 
features of this consciousness globally has been utilisation of developments overseas and 
internationally in order to persuade courts to advance domestic protection of human rights. 
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that the Court of Appeal during the presidency of Cooke 
P was generally more liberal and willing to develop New Zealand law in the human rights 
field.  It was consistent with this philosophy that more reference would be made to 
international developments as a justification for advancing human rights protection in New 
Zealand. 
67 See eg Baigent's case above n 7 at 74 (per Casey J), and Tavita above n 7 at 40­41.
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